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 The Pakistan government has been under severe pressure from the World 
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and International Intellectual Property 
Alliance to tighten its anti-piracy regime. In 2000, IIPA recommended Pakistan to be 
placed on the watch list of major violators of international intellectual property 
legislation. According to IIPA, Pakistani copyright law is TRIPS-incompatible. The 
Alliance called for a TRIPS-compatible draft that should take into account new 
technologies including implementation of provisions of WIPO treaties like WCT and 
WPPT. 
 
 The current estimated value of the worth of Pakistani piracy is over US$ 100 
million. The Pakistani piracy operation is said to include motion pictures, sound 
recording, computer programs, computer entertainment and books.  
 
 Subsequent reports from IIPA in 2002 and in 2005 have placed additional 
emphasis on computer software piracy that includes operating systems; computer 
applications; games; and computer compatible motion pictures and music. It called for 
the closure of six optical media copying plants out of which four were said to be in 
Karachi.  
 
 The Musharraf government has accepted these demands and various crackdowns 
have been conducted on Rainbow Center Karachi which is said to produce the bulk of 
pirated optical media like CDs and DVDs. On a visit to the United States, Musharraf met 
with the Chairman of Microsofts and reaffirmed Pakistan’s commitment to anti-piracy 
crusade. 
 
 In early 2006, all optical media copying facilities were sealed by the law 
enforcement agencies but the authorities gave in later to pressure from various quarters. 
 
 Pakistani Copyright Law has been criticized and the following amendments are 
proposed by the international agencies: 
 
 There shall be an express rental right for computer programs and sound recording. 
The reproduction and translation compulsory license, though amended in 1992, shall be 
made compatible with the 1971 Berne Appendix. 
 
 Foreign sound recording shall be provided a clear point of attachment. 
 
 Civil ex-parte search orders, essential to enforce against end-user piracy shall be 
provided. They are compatible with Article 50 to TRIPS. 
 
 WTO has asked Pakistan to conform to the international concerns regarding this 
issue of piracy.  
  
 An unexplored aspect is the economic impact of these strict measures, proposed 
by IIPA and WIPO, on the average computer software vendor in Pakistan. This sector 
provides employment to a large number of people all over the country. A large number of 
small to medium sized businesses rely on pirated software because of the costs and 
obligations attached with legal software.  
 
 This study seeks to answer the question: will implementing WTO-compliant anti-
piracy measures result in lower sales for the average computer vendor in Karachi. 
 
The Rationale for IPR 
 
 Earlier studies have highlighted the inherent tensions that exist between the 
Intellectual Property Regime1  and competition. In a capitalist economy, competition is 
seen by most as generally important and indeed essential to curb market distortions, 
induce efficiency in use of resources, prevent monopoly or oligopoly, maintain prices at 
fair levels, as low as possible, prevent excessive or monopoly profits and promote 
consumer interests and welfare (Khor, 2005). 
 
 An IPR is seen by many as a privilege granted in recognition of the need of the 
holder to recoup costs incurred in the research and innovation process, so as to maintain 
incentives for further innovation. Thus an IP2  entails an exclusive right for a limited time, 
enabling the holder to charge a higher price than the cost of production. That higher price 
reduces access of consumers to the product, and access of other producers to production 
inputs and methods. The monopoly granted prevents or deters competition from rivals 
that can sell at lower prices. These are costs that are seen to be short-term (since the 
exclusive right is of limited duration), but which are supposed to be outweighed by the 
long-term benefits brought about by the innovation which IPRs encourage (Watal, 2001). 
 
 The optimal degree of protection (where social benefits are judged to exceed 
social costs) is said to vary widely by product and sector and is supposed to be linked to 
variations in demand, market structures, R&D costs and the nature of the innovative 
process (CIPR, 2002). In reality, the IPR regime cannot be tailored so precisely and 
therefore the level of protection afforded in practice is necessarily a compromise. Striking 
the wrong compromise – whether too much or too little – may be costly to society, 
especially in the longer term. 
 
 There is thus a balancing required between the monopoly privilege granted to the 
IP holders and the public interest (including consumer welfare, the competition from 
other producers, and national development prospects). The appropriate balance requires 
the right policies that enable IP to be appropriately given for correct reasons and to the 
correct parties, and that they be of an appropriate period, and that flexibilities and 
exemptions and exclusions are provided to safeguard vital public interests. If the balance 
is tilted excessively to the IP holder, then one consequence is that the IP facilitates a 
stream of monopoly profits beyond what is justified for recovering the costs of 
innovation, and society bears the costs unreasonably. These may include prevention of 
access to goods and services (including essentials such as medicines, food and 
information, and important inputs for production), curbing of economic development, an 
overall reduction in competition and its benefits for resource allocation, and a 
monopolization in products, sectors or the economy as a whole (Jaffe & Lerner, 2004). 
Recent trends in major developed countries have shifted the balance  
further in favor of IP rights holders. 
 
 WIPO has been an active forum for IP harmonization, for example through its 
1996 Copyright Treaty. The present negotiations for possible new treaties relating to 
patents and to broadcasting are other examples. In fact, WIPO has become a more active 
forum for negotiations new treaties aimed at harmonization of IP systems and rules than 
the WTO. If current patent harmonization negotiations proceed along the lines advocated 
by the developed countries in the substantive patent law treaty process, there is a strong 
possibility that the results of recent developments in the major countries (such as the 
relaxing of criteria of patentability and the much easier granting of patents) will be 
disseminated to the rest of the world. There is thus a danger of what many analysts 
consider a dysfunctional system being disseminated to developing countries (Khor, 2005) 
 
 Recent studies show the high extent of costs incurred by developing countries. 
The former chief of trade policy research in the World Bank, Michael Finger (2002), 
estimates that the obligations on developing countries to implement TRIPS will result in 
increased payments by them of US$60 billion a year. A report by the World Bank (2002) 
estimates that the net annual increase in patent rents resulting from TRIPS for the top six 
developed countries in this field will be US$41 billion (with the top beneficiaries being 
America with  
$19 billion, Germany $6.8 billion, Japan $5.7 billion, France $3.3 billion, Britain $3 
billion and Switzerland $2 billion). Developing countries that will incur major annual net 
losses include South Korea ($15.3 billion), China ($5.1 billion), Mexico ($2.6 billion), 
India ($903 million), and Brazil ($530 million). 
 
 Well-known trade economists who advocate free trade have also criticized the 
imbalances of TRIPS and the adverse effects on competition caused by the upward 
harmonization of IP standards induced by TRIPS. Jagdish Bhagwati, an economics 
professor at Columbia University, in a letter to Financial Times (2001), argued that the 
WTO must be about mutual gains in trade whereas IP protection is a tax on the poor 
countries’ use of knowledge, constituting a wealth transfer to the rich countries. He 
advocated that the TRIPS agreement be removed from the WTO. 
 
 Analysts have asked governments in the Third World to do a cost-benefit analysis 
before implementing the demands of IIPA. They have suggested that abrupt 
implementation of such demands would damage the economy especially small business 
and employment. They have also stressed the need to find out the reasons for the limited 
appeal of genuine copyrighted products in the Third World (Khor, 2005). 
 
 It is interesting to note that Noam Chomsky has rejected the rationale for IPR by 
stating that most “intellectual property” treasures were nursed with public subsidy in their 




 A questionnaire was developed addressed to computer software vendors. The 
study has focused on computer software vendors because they are expected to know the 
business of selling software. They were chosen because of their unique position in the 
software supply chain. Their daily interaction with individual, corporate and government 
clients should mean that they understand the mindset of these customers and would know 
their buying decision variables. 
 
 Most questions use a nominal scale with one using ordinal scale. 
 
 The questionnaire contained seventeen (17) questions in all and focuses on the 
following areas: 
 
 Questions 1 to 6 are concerned with the general buying and selling environment 
that exists in the sampled area. They probe issues that provide information regarding the 
general status of things in the current software market. 
 
 Question 7 probes the rationale for the lack of appeal of genuine software. 
 
 Questions 8 to 11 probe the product-support-service aspect of software sales. 
These questions analyze the augmentation impact of product-support-services that come 
with genuine  
software. 
 
 Questions 12 to 14 probe the impact of anti-piracy measures on hardware prices. 
 
 Questions 15 & 16 are concerned with the profitability of software vendors. 
 
 Question 17 probes the prospects of Pakistani software in a strict anti-piracy 
regime. 
 
 Karachi is a very large software market, so selecting a representative sample from 
the whole city was difficult. The hub of Karachi’s software is the area of I I Chundrigar 
Road and Rainbow Centre. According to the Yellow pages, there are a total of about six 
hundred (600) computer software and hardware vendors in this area. They were 
considered to be a representative population. A simple random sample was taken to select 
fifteen percent (15%) of these vendors who were to be questioned for this survey.  
 
 Ninety (90) questionnaires were distributed among various vendors in the I I 
Chundrigar Road and Rainbow Centre areas.  
 
 The answers were fed into a Microsoft Excel Worksheet. A question-by-question 
approach1  was used in combination with a question-versus-question approach2 . Chi-
square test, Binomial Distribution and Percentage Distribution are used as analysis 
techniques. Graphs and Pivot table are used for on-screen analysis. 
 
 The hypothesis developed was: 
 
Ho: a WTO-compliant anti-piracy regime would decrease business opportunities of a 
mid-sized Pakistani software vendor 
 
H1: a WTO-compliant anti-piracy regime would not decrease business opportunities 




 Question 1: Are you aware of the difference between pirated and genuinely 
licensed computer software? 
 
 The question was almost tautological as there is already a substantial level of 
awareness regarding this issue. As the sample selected was primarily of the more 
sophisticated sales area in Karachi, the tautological nature of this question might get 
further strengthened. The question, however, was deemed necessary because pockets of 
vendors may exist that are ignorant of this issue.  
 
 Ignorance of the issue of anti-piracy would have made all subsequent questions 
redundant. However, the negative answer bearing questionnaires had been included in the 
subsequent analysis to give a more comprehensive picture of the anti-piracy issue. 
 
 The number of ignorant vendors is most likely to increase when sample is taken 
from the lesser-privileged areas of Karachi. 
 
 
                               Response         Frequency  
                                  Yes               86  
                                  No               4 
 
HA0: At least ninety percent of all software vendors are aware of the issue of software 
piracy 
 
HA1: At least Ninety Percent of all software vendors are not aware of the issue of 
software piracy 
 
HA0: ∏ ≥ 90 
HA1: ∏ < 90 
∝= 0.05 
np > 500 (90*90 = 8100, satisfied) 
using  
zcal = 1.7552 
ztab = 1.6449 
As zcal > ztab, the hypothesis is accepted. 
 
 Hence at least 90% of software vendors are aware of the issue of computer piracy. 
 
 Question 2: Of overall software sales in the previous year, what percentage was of 
genuinely licensed software? 
 
 Any anti-piracy move would disrupt sales of pirated software. It was assumed that 
most vendors would be losing a substantial part of their sales due to anti-piracy measures. 
 
HB0: The proportion of genuine software sales in overall sales is evenly distributed 
 
HB1:  The proportion of genuine software sales in overall sales is not evenly distributed 
 
  
       Response Frequency N Percentage  
       I don’t know 17 90 18.88  
       Less than 10% 35 90 38.88  
      Between 11 & 24% 16 90 17.77  
      Between 25 & 49% 13 90 14.44  
      More than 50% 9 90 10.0  
 
Degree of Freedom = 4 
Significance = 0.05 
Chi-Square Tabulated Value = 9.4877 
Chi-Square Calculated Value = 22.22 
As Chitab < Chical, it falls in the rejection region.  
 
 So, the proportion of genuine software sales in overall is not evenly distributed. 
 
 Question 3: What segment is your biggest buyer? 
 
 The underlying assumption behind this question was that multinational companies 
would be more receptive of any push in the direction of genuine software sales. So I 
assumed that vendors with multinational clients, forming the majority of the client base, 
would be more receptive anti-piracy measures. 
 
HC0: The sector-wise distribution of buyers is evenly distributed 
 
HC1:  The sector-wise distribution of buyers is not evenly distributed 
 
       Response Frequency N Percentage  
       Govt. Organizations 8 90 8.08  
       Individuals 31 90 34.44  
      Local Firms 31 90 34.44  
      Multinationals 20 90 22.22  
 
Degree of Freedom = 3 
Significance = 0.05 
Chi-Square Tabulated Value = 7.8147 
Chi-Square Calculated Value = 16.044 
As Chitab < Chical, it falls in the rejection region.  
 
 So, The sector-wise distribution of buyers is not evenly distributed. 
 
 Question 4: Do you think that most of your corporate clients are aware of 





 Large corporate clients were expected to be more aware of the issue of software 
piracy. Being businesses, they were expected to understand the impact of piracy on 
software manufacturers. Though, in a capitalist regime, they were expected to benefit 
from piracy whenever and wherever possible, at least the cost of awareness campaign 
was expected to be low for most large corporate clients. I assumed that on the other side, 
there might exist a large number of small businesses using pirated software that might not 
even be aware of the issue at all. Employees working in IT departments might know but 
strategic level management might not know. In such a case, the cost of awareness 
campaign would increase substantially. 
 
                               Response     Frequency                           
 
HD0: At least 70% of all corporate clients are aware of computer software piracy 
 
HD1: At least 70% of all corporate clients are not aware of computer software piracy 
 
HD0: ∏ ≥ 70 
HD1: ∏ < 70 
∝= 0.05 
np > 500 (90*70 = 6300, satisfied) 
 
using  
zcal = 3.680 
ztab = 1.6449 
As zcal > ztab, the hypothesis is accepted. 
 
 So, at least 70% of all corporate clients are aware of computer software piracy 
 
 Question 5: Do corporate clients insist on buying genuinely licensed software? 
 
 Most multinationals were instructed by their principals overseas to buy a 
particular brand of software under international level corporate deals. They were 
expected to be more proactive in the acceptance of incurring expense of buying genuine 
software. 
 
                                      Response       Frequency 
                                          Yes             40 
                                          No             50 
  
HE0: At least 70% of all corporate clients insist on buying genuine software 
 





HE0: ∏ ≥ 70 
HE1: ∏ < 70 
∝= 0.05 
np > 500 (90*70 = 6300, satisfied) 
using  
 
zcal = -6.62 
ztab = 1.6449 
As zcal < ztab, the hypothesis is rejected. 
 
 So, at least 70% of all corporate clients do not insist on buying genuine software 
 
 Question 6: Have you ever tried to persuade your corporate client to buy genuine 
software? 
 
 Due to anti-piracy crackdowns, some vendors were expected to be keen on 
avoiding any inconvenience regarding the issue of computer piracy. Some might believe 
that benefits of selling pirated software may be less than the cost incurred if in future a 
software manufacturer brings legal action against them. With this mindset, they might be 
educating their corporate clients to buy genuine software which would not only increase 
their sales but would have also protected them against future inconvenience. 
 
                               Response      Frequency 
                                  Yes           38 
                                  No           52 
  
HF0: At least 50% of all vendors have persuaded their corporate clients to buy genuine 
software 
 
HF1: At least 50% of all vendors have not persuaded their corporate clients to buy 
genuine software 
HF0: ∏ ≥ 50 
HF1: ∏ < 50 
∝= 0.05 
np > 500 (90*50 = 4500, satisfied) 
 
using  
zcal = -0.75 
ztab = 1.6449 
As zcal < ztab, the hypothesis is rejected. 




 Question 7: What is the main reason (in your opinion) for the limited appeal of 
genuine software? 
 
 In this question I wanted to analyze the reasons because of which even corporate 
clients do not buy genuine software. Most anti-piracy debates focus on the cost factor 
alone while ignoring other aspects of software sales like compulsory re-buy situations. 
 
HG0: The main reasons for limited appeal of genuine software are evenly distributed 
 
HG1:  The main reasons for limited appeal of genuine software are not evenly 
distributed 
 
 Response Frequency N Percentage  
 Cost of buying      24 90 26.66  
 Compulsory re-buy situation   17 90 18.88  
 Ignorance      8 90 8.88  
 Cost may be manageable     10 90 11.11  
  but it is seen as an unwanted 
 expense 
 I don’t know    12 90 13.33   
 Clients think that it is an      3 90 3.33  
 unimportant matter despite  
 knowing the issue 
 Cost of Maintenance    16 90 17.77  
 
Degree of Freedom = 6 
Significance = 0.05 
Chi-Square Tabulated Value = 12.59 
Chi-Square Calculated Value = 21.844 
As Chitab < Chical, it falls in the rejection region.  
 
 So, the main reasons for limited appeal of genuine software are not evenly 
distributed. 
 
 Question 8: Do you provide after-sales service for pirated computer software? 
 
 Some vendors derive their business by providing after-sales-services like software 
installation and troubleshooting. They may oppose any anti-piracy measure that robs 
them of this source of income. 
 
HH0: Percentage of vendors providing after-sales service for pirated software is evenly 
distributed 
 




                    Response         Frequency           N               Percentage  
                       Yes             60            90                   66.66  
                       No             26            90                   28.88  
                 I don’t know              4            90                   6.66  
 
Degree of Freedom = 2 
Significance = 0.05 
Chi-Square Tabulated Value = 5.9915 
Chi-Square Calculated Value = 53.0667 
As Chitab < Chical, it falls in the rejection region.  
 So, percentage of vendors providing after-sales service for pirated software is not 
evenly distributed. 
 
 Question 9: Do you provide after-sales service for licensed computer software?’ 
 
 Some clients who use genuine software like those buying branded computers 
(genuine operating system is bundled with branded computer sales) don’t go to the 
software manufacturers’ outlets due to the fact that not many outlets exist. Others avoid 
for other reasons. This has resulted in business for street vendors who charge for the 
provision of “after-sales-services”. These vendors might resist strict anti-piracy measures. 
 
HI0: Percentage of vendors providing after-sales service for licensed software is evenly 
distributed 
 
HI1:  Percentage of vendors providing after-sales service for licensed software is not 
evenly distributed 
 
                          Response           Frequency            N          Percentage  
                              Yes                 82              90              91.11  
                              No                 1              90              1.11  
                       I don’t know                 7              90              7.77  
 
Degree of Freedom = 2 
Significance = 0.05 
Chi-Square Tabulated Value = 5.9915 
Chi-Square Calculated Value = 135.8 
As Chitab < Chical, it falls in the rejection region.  
 
 So, percentage of vendors providing after-sales service for licensed software is 
not evenly distributed. 
 
 Question 10: Are your corporate clients aware that most genuine computer 
software comes with top of the line after-sales service? 
 
 Most genuine software comes with top of the line after-sales-service support. The 
manufacturers provide free upgrades, bug-fixes and other facilities. This surely makes the 
whole experience of using genuine software more worthwhile. For corporate clients, 
manufacturers also offer customization options that are not available on pirated software. 
This meant that vendors would be against anti-piracy measures because these measures 
robbed them of this source of revenue. 
 
HJ0: Corporate Clients’ awareness about after-sales service attached to genuine 
software is evenly distributed 
 
HJ1:  Corporate Clients’ awareness about after-sales service attached to genuine 
software is not evenly distributed 
 
                           Response              Frequency            N          Percentage 
                                Yes                    31                   90             34.44  
                                No                    28                   90             31.11  
                         I don’t know                   31                90              34.44  
 
Degree of Freedom = 2 
Significance = 0.05 
Chi-Square Tabulated Value = 5.9915 
Chi-Square Calculated Value = 0.2 
As Chitab > Chical, it falls in the acceptance region.  
 
 So, corporate Clients’ awareness about after-sales service attached to genuine 
software is evenly distributed. 
 
 Question 11: Have you ever tried to educate your clients on this matter? 
 
 In a strict anti-piracy regime, there would be a substantial need for after-sales-
support. Most of this business would have to be outsourced to existing vendors. Some 
vendors are expected to see this coming and might, hence, persuade their clients on 
shifting to genuine software. Any association formed with a global software manufacturer 
would surely enhance the image of the software vendor which might be an added 
advantage. 
 
HK0: At least 50% vendors have tried to persuade their clients to buy genuine software 
 
HK1:  At least 50% vendors have not tried to persuade their clients to buy genuine 
software 
 
                          Response                 Frequency            N           Percentage  
                               Yes                 56                   90             62.22  
                               No                 34                   90             37.77  
 
 
HK0: ∏ ≥ 50 
HK1: ∏ < 50 
∝= 0.05 
np > 500 (90*50 = 4500, satisfied) 
using  
 
zcal = 2.319 
ztab = 1.6449 
As zcal > ztab, the hypothesis is accepted. 
 
 So, at least 50% of all vendors have persuaded their corporate clients to buy 
genuine software. 
 
 Question 12: Will Hardware sales decrease due to strict anti-piracy measures? 
  
 A substantial part of computer sales is on hardware upgrades. Many domestic 
users of computers use them for entertainment like computer games. The incremental 
requirement of hardware for each new title is a big demand creator. A lot of vendors sell 
computer memory and graphic cards for this segment of computer game players. With no 
pirated games available, the sales of these upgrades would have deteriorated substantially 
as the genuine games are very expensive. Most popular titles start from US$ 100 (Rs. 
6000 approximately). Every new operating system merits some addition to the hardware 
like memory upgrade. Small firms using graphics software will be most badly hit as an 
average computer costs them about Rs. 1 hundred thousand. With genuine software, the 
cost would double. This was expected to curb the overall demand of computer hardware. 
 
HL0: At least 90% people think that hardware sales will decrease due to strict anti-
piracy measures 
 
HL1:  At least 90% people think that hardware sales will not decrease due to strict anti-
piracy measures 
 
                           Response             Frequency            N          Percentage  
                                Yes                   83                 90              92.22  
                                No                    7                 90               7.77  
 
HL0: ∏ ≥ 90 
HL1: ∏ < 90 
∝= 0.05 
np > 500 (90*90 = 8100, satisfied) 
using   
 
 
zcal = 70.27 
ztab = 1.6449 
As zcal > ztab, the hypothesis is accepted. 
 
 So, at least 90% of all vendors think that hardware sales will decrease if strict 
anti-piracy measures are enacted. 
 
 Question 13: Will anti-piracy measures drive the hardware prices down? 
 
 Many computer hardware components are expensive because of overwhelming 
demand. Prices of high-end memory and graphic cards are often inflated due to high 
demand. If this demand decreases due to more expensive software, the price of these 
hardware components may come down. 
HM0: At least 90% people think that hardware prices will decrease due to strict anti-
piracy measures 
 
HM1:  At least 90% people think that hardware prices will not decrease due to strict anti-
piracy measures 
 
                         Response            Frequency           N            Percentage 
                             Yes                72              90                 80  
                             No                18              90                 20  
 
HM0: ∏ ≥ 90 
HM1: ∏ < 90 
∝= 0.05 
np > 500 (90*90 = 8100, satisfied) 
using  
 
zcal = -3.16 
ztab = 1.6449 
As zcal < ztab, the hypothesis is rejected. 
 
 So, at least 90% vendors think that the price of hardware will not decease if strict 
anti-piracy measures are enacted. 
 
 Question 14: Will anti-piracy measures increase the overall cost of computer 
system purchase? 
 
 Some computer journalists in the West are talking about software-hardware 
bundling. In this situation hardware sales would be subsidized by software companies. A 
similar situation may arise globally and to a lesser extent locally. Hardware capacity is 
already more than required. 
 
HN0: At least 90% people think that overall cost of computer purchase will increase 
 
HN1:  At least 90% people think that overall cost of computer purchase will not increase 
 
                         Response          Frequency             N          Percentage  
                             Yes              66              90             73.33  
                             No              24               90             26.66  
 
HN0: ∏ ≥ 90 
HN1: ∏ < 90 
∝= 0.05 
np > 500 (90*90 = 8100, satisfied) 
using  
 
zcal = -5.2715 
ztab = 1.6449 
As zcal < ztab, the hypothesis is rejected. 
 
 So, at least 90% vendors think that the cost of purchase of computer will not 
increase if strict anti-piracy measures are enacted. 
 
 Question 15: What will be the long-run impact of strict anti-piracy measures on 
your business? 
 
 The assumption was that, in the long run, software vendors would be fully 
compensated by the market forces which will adjust demand and supply such that the 
overall profitability would not be markedly different from profitability today. 
 
HO0: At least 90% vendors think that strict anti-piracy measures will increase sales in 
the long run 
 
HO1:  At least 90% vendors think that strict anti-piracy measures will not increase sales 
in the long run 
 
                        Response          Frequency             N          Percentage  
                           Yes              67               90             74.44  
                           No              23               90             25.55  
 
HO0: ∏ ≥ 90 
HO1: ∏ < 90 
∝= 0.05 
np > 500 (90*90 = 8100, satisfied) 
using  
 
zcal = -28.225 
ztab = 1.6449 
As zcal < ztab, the hypothesis is rejected. 
 
 So, at least 90% vendors think that strict anti-piracy measures will not increase 
sales in the long run. 
 
 Question 16: What will be the short-run impact of strict anti-piracy measures on 
your business? 
 
 In the short-run, a catastrophe was expected for many vendors as they would lose 
revenues from hardware sales, software sales and an overall lowering of consumers’ 
mood. 
 
HP0: At least 50% vendors think that strict anti-piracy measures will increase sales in 
the long run 
 
HP1:  At least 50% vendors think that strict anti-piracy measures will not increase sales 
in the long run 
 
                          Response        Frequency         N        Percentage  
                              Yes            36          90           40%   
                              No           54          90           60%  
 
HP0: ∏ ≥ 50 
HP1: ∏ < 50 
∝= 0.05 
np > 500 (90*50 = 4500, satisfied) 
using  
zcal = -1.89 
ztab = 1.6449 
As zcal < ztab, the hypothesis is rejected. 
 
 So, at least 50% vendors think that strict anti-piracy measures will not increase 




 Question 17: Do you think that Pakistani Software would sell (keeping in mind 
the current quality) if there is a strict anti-piracy regime in Pakistan? 
 
 This question probed the chances of Pakistani software in a strict anti-piracy 
regime. The question was whether Pakistani software manufacturers would gain anything 
substantial under stricter laws. 
 
HQ0: At least 60% vendors think that the sales of Pakistani software will increase if 
strict anti-piracy measures are enacted 
 
HQ1:  At least 60% vendors think that the sales of Pakistani software will not increase if 
strict anti-piracy measures are enacted 
 
                         Response           Frequency              N          Percentage  
                              Yes                28                 90            31.11%  
                              No                62                 90            68.88%  
 
HP0: ∏ ≥ 60 
HP1: ∏ < 60 
∝= 0.05 
np > 500 (90*60 = 5400, satisfied) 
using  
zcal = -11.55 
ztab = 1.6449 
As zcal < ztab, the hypothesis is rejected. 
 
 So, at least 60% vendors think that strict anti-piracy measures will not increase 




 A wide range study which samples from the whole city would be very beneficial 
in calculating the complete impact of anti-piracy measures on the Pakistani Computer 
Software & Hardware Vendor Industry. 
 
 The issue of piracy in its full context may also be explored. The study could focus 
on specific factors concerning piracy and may probe the length and breadth of awareness 
level regarding computer piracy. 
 
 Intellectual Property is an international concern but the government shall 
seriously consider its full impact before taking any serious measures. 
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